Chapter VII.

 

Uranium, Depleted Uranium and the Environment

 

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Summary:

 

Natural uranium is ubiquitous in our environment. It is present in the earth, the air we breath and the water we drink. As a species, we have thus always been subjected to uranium exposure. It is likely that this background radiation and heavy-metal exposure is responsible for a certain on-going “base” level of human disease and death experienced by our species since the dawn of time. However, uranium does not appear in nature in its purified metallic form, nor does it manifest itself in particulates of dust so fine (less than 5 microns in diameter) as to become deeply embedded in the lungs, nor does it take on the particularly insoluble crystalline structure of a ceramic. Unfortunately, all three of these characteristics describe the nature of depleted uranium when it is used in munitions. When U and DU burn (as happens when a DU shell strikes a hard object), an aerosol of these ultra-fine particles of uranium oxide ceramic form and can become dispersed far beyond the battlefield in which they were used.

 

Details:

 

Several reports and articles have been published characterizing the nature of uranium and depleted uranium munitions. In 1980, Glissmeyer (1) reported characteristics of airborne DU (size distribution, quantity and dispersion) from test firing 105-mm penetrators and Ensminger (2) reported on procedures to calculate health risks resulting from these airborne particulates. Elder (3) studied the oxidation features of the burning DU aerosols and estimated that complete oxidation of a sample could take place in a sustained fire. In 2003, Chazel (30) reported the results of studying actual aerosol samples resulting from DU penetrator strikes on tank armour and found the average particle size to be 1 to 2 microns in diameter, and aerosol concentration to be 8.5 mg of DU per cubic meter of air. Parkhurst (31) described the parameters and testing procedures used for a comprehensive analysis of DU aerosols produced inside a tank hit by a DU penetrator, with results to be published in a later paper.

 

Hooker (5) and Robitaille (6) determined that the radiological exposure to tank crews from DU munitions stored in the tank was within occupational accepted levels. Shinn (8) reported on the metal particle dispersion resulting from explosion of a DU test round.

 

Trzaskoma (4) and McIntyre (7) studied the corrosion properties of  DU and DU alloys in air, moist salt air (7% wt. loss in 30 days), and salt water. Graham (12) modeled mobilization and transport of DU in surface waters while Grsic (20) and Mitsakou (41) have modeled dispersion of DU aerosols. In 2002, Chen (25) reported modelling the subsurface behavior of DU. Durante (26), (39) used models to asses the health risks associated with use of DU munitions and concluded that radiological risk could be ignored and that chemical toxicity from DU use in the Balkans was most likely to occur through water contamination rather than air and was well within acceptable limits of exposure.

 

In 1990, Erickson (9) published a review on the environmental behavior of DU from DU penetrators, and Ebinger (10) reported on the fate of DU from testing at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds. In 2005, Fan (49) reports on a computer simulation assessment of the environmental damage to flora and fauna in these two areas using a probabilistic ecological risk assessment approach.

 

In 1995, Bou-Rabee (11) analyzed soil and air samples in Kuwait for DU and determined that not enough uranium would be inhaled by residents to impose a health risk. In 1999, Fetter (14) reported that rescuers and cleanup crews working around equipment hit by DU penetrators were at high risk from heavy-metal toxicity from DU aerosols. On the other hand, Bem (42) in 2004 reported that total uranium concentrations in soil samples in Kuwait and southern Iraq (both DU and NU) fell below world averages for NU and therefore were of no concern.

 

In 1992, a Boeing 747 cargo plane with DU counterweights crashed in Amsterdam, and 330 pounds of DU were never recovered from the crash site. In 2000, Uijt de Haag (17) used models to report an assessment of the risk to residents’ health posed by the resulting DU contamination of their environment and determined the health risk to be negligible.

 

NATO’s use of DU in the Balkans initiated numerous studies on the behavior of DU in this region. In 1999, Sitaras (13) looked into the impact of DU munitions use by NATO in the Yugoslavia. Duric’s (15) review attempted to determine a zero-state biological reference for uranium in the region in order to ascertain future risks and damage associated by DU contamination. Pavlovic (16) ran DU analyses of food and drinking water for DU following the war. In 2001, Kerekes’ (18) use of alpha spectrometry on airborne samples in Hungary to detect DU resulting from NATO bombing in northern Yugoslavia came up negative for DU, but he reported an increase in the background level of natural uranium in the soil that he attributed to fallout from the bombing. Bettinelli (44) studied isotope ratios for uranium in fish from the north Adriatic and found only natural uranium contamination at expected “normal” levels.

Sansone (19) analyzed soil surrounding DU penetrator impact sites and found elevated uranium levels within a 2-meter radius and 10 to 20 cm deep into the soil. He also reported (24) on water, soil, tree bark and lichen samples taken from Kosovo. The soil samples ranged from 10 mg/kg of DU to as much as 18 grams of DU per kilogram of soil. All bark and lichen samples tested positive for DU (probably from aerosolized DU), even in locations where the soil samples showed no DU. On the other hand, Loppi (40) reported finding no DU in lichens retrieved from the Balkans. Orlic (21) wrote on the health and environmental effects expected from NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. Papachristodoulou (38) used gamma spectroscopy to analyze for DU in Kosovo samples. Di Lella studied both lichens (45) and soil and earthworms (46)  near Kosovo, using these biomarkers to asses environmental contamination from DU. He reports no sign of DU in the lichens, and although finding variable U235/U238 ratios of uranium in earthworms collected near DU penetrator holes, since the absolute burden of uranium in the worms and soil fall within naturally occurring uranium limits, concludes that widespread environmental contamination with DU did not occur. Meanwhile, Bikit (48) studied soil in the Vojvodina area and found no increased radioactivity in his samples.

 

Boulyga (22), analyzed soil samples and a penetrator shell from Kosovo with ICP-MS and alpha spectrometry and discovered both plutonium and amerecium mixed with the DU in the penetrator, indicating that the DU had come from nuclear reactor waste material. Desideri (27), Pollanen (33), and McLaughlin (35) reported similar results while Danessi (32), of the International Nuclear Energy Agency disagreed, concluding that the plutonium levels could be explained from nuclear testing fallout.  Danessi (34) reported in another paper that the DU particles in soil samples were generally less than 5 microns in diameter, with 50% of the particles smaller than 1.5 microns. In mid 2002, Papastefanou (28) reviewed these data, and at the same time Uyttenhove (29) reported gamma spectroscopy on 50 Kosovo samples taken from sites where DU use had been reported and found no trace of DU in any sample. Salbu (47) in 2005 reports on the oxidation states of residual DU from Kuwait, both from destroyed tanks and from a munitions dump fire, and also discovered the presence of enough U236 in the dump-fire samples to implicate the original source of DU to be reprocessed nuclear fuel.

 

Salbu (36) studied samples from Kosovo soil and determined that 50% of the particles (avg. size 2 microns) were the more insoluble UO2 (vs. U3O8).

 

Hamilton (23) writes in 2001 that concerns about DU contamination in the environment result from poor understanding of basic geologic distribution principles and ignorance of general health physics. Meinrath (37) describes the Erzgebirge region in Germany where a great deal of uranium was mined for the former USSR and the 6.5 billion Euros that have been expended since 1991 for environmental cleanup.

 

Adrovic (43) in 2004 reports on radiation levels surrounding coal fired power plants, providing data to help determine background radiation levels in areas proximal to these facilities.

 

 

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1.      Characterization of airborne uranium from test firing of XM774 ammunition, by JA Glissmeyer, et al., Battelle Pac. NW Lab, Richland, WA. Energy Res. Abstr. Vol. 5(5), 1980 (abstr. no. 7563)

The airborne DU resulting from the test firings of 105-mm APFSDS-t XM774 ammunition was determined to evaluate the human inhalation exposure to the DU. The size distribution of airborne DU; the quantity of airborne DU, the dispersion of airborne DU from the target vicinity, the amt. of DU deposited on the ground, the soly. of airborne DU compds. in lung fluid and oxide forms of airborne and fallout DU were studied.

[Glissmeyer1980xxERAv5n5p7563].

 

2.      Procedures to calculate radiological and toxicological exposures from airborne releases of depleted uranium, by DA Ensminger, et al., Anal. Sci. Corp., Reading MA. Gov. Rep. Announce. Index (US) Vol. 81(10), 1981 (p. 2091).

The 105-mm XM774 and M735A1 shells containing a DU penetrator are analyzed for their radiological and chemical toxicities.

[Ensminger1981xxGRAIv81n10p2091].

 

3.      Oxidation of depleted uranium penetrators and aerosol dispersal at high temperatures, by JC Elder, Los Alamos Sci. Lab, Los Alamos, NM. Energy Res. Abstracts Vol. 6(8), 1981 (abstr. no. 11536).

Oxidation of DU aerosols in the respirable range was min. at 700 deg. in air and 800 deg. in 50/50 air CO2, indicating some self-protection at higher temperatures. There was no evidence of self-sustained burning, though complete sample oxidation can be expected in a sustained blaze.

[Elder1981xxERAv6n8p11536].

 

4.      A comparison of the corrosion and stress corrosion resistance of two depleted uranium alloys: DU-0.75Ti and DU-2Mo, by PP Trzaskoma, Nav. Res. Lab, Washington, DC.  Gov. Rep. Announce. Index (US) Vol. 81(21), 1981 (p. 4599).

The observed corrosion rates in moist air were low, but that for the titanium alloy in salt fog increased sharply. Approx. 7% weight loss was observed in 30 days.

[Trzaskoma1981xxGRAIv81n21p4599].

 

5.      Radiological assessment of cartridge 120-mm APFSDS-T XM829 ammunition, by CD Hooker, et al., Pac. NW Lab, Richmond, WA. INIS Atomindex Vol. 15(17), 1984 (abstr. no. 15:052427).

Shielding on the XM-829 rounds effectively block beta radiation, leaving gamma radiation the predominant emission. These are low such that military personnel are not likely to exceed the maximum permissable nonoccupational dose (Army Reg. 40-14) and properly packaged munitions may be exempted from special marking and labeling requirements.

[Hooker1984xxINISAv15n17p052427].

 

6.      Gamma-ray exposure hazard due to storage of M-774 APFSDS rounds in a Leopard C-1 main battle tank, by HA Robitaille, Defence Res. Establ., Ottawa, On, Can.  Gov. Rep. Announce Index (US) Vol. 84(7), 1984 (p. 56).

Concludes that 29 of the M-744 shells (with 3.4 kg Duper round) exposes the loader’s position to 0.17 mrad/hr, or 29 mrad/week (168 hours), ¼ the max. currently allowed by Canadian fources regulators, so therefore is not a significant gamma radiation hazard to Leopard C1 crew members.

[Robitaille1984xxGRAIv84n7p56].

 

7.      Galvanic corrosion behavior of depleted uranium in synthetic seawater coupled to aluminum, magnesium and mild steel, by JF McIntyre, et al., Naval Surf. Weapons Center, Silver Spring, MD, Corrosion Vol. 44(8), 1988 (pp. 502-10).

[McIntyre1988xxCv44n8p502].

 

8.      An environmental analysis of metal particle dispersion from an explosive test at Tonopah Test Range, by JH Shinn, Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab, Livermore, CA, Energy Res. Abstr. Vol. 13(16), 1988 (Abstract 37713).

[Shinn1988xxERAv13n16p37713].

 

9.      A review of the environmental behavior of uranium derived from depleted uranium penetrators, by R. Erikson, et al., Pac. Northwest Lab, richland, WA. Energy Res. Abstr. Vol. 15(7), 1990 (abstr. no. 16179).

[Erikson1990xxERAv15n7p16179].

 

10.    Long-term fate of depleted uranium at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds: Final Report, Phase 1: Geochemical transport and modeling, by MH Ebinger, et al., Los Alamos Natl. Lab, Los Alamos, NM. Energy Res. Abstr. Vol. 15(16), 1990 (abstr. no. 36795).

Soil samples beneath a penetrator fragment at humid APG site showed 12% DU in the surface horizon and significantly above background to a depth of 20 cm, and while surface water showed only background levels of U, bottom sediments were contaminated with DU. At arid YPG site, only 0.5% of U in the surface horizon and background concentrations of U and DU to 20 cm depth were found. Concluded that at APG, water dissolution and transport was primary cause of transport, while at YPG dispersion was due mainly to erosion.

[Ebinger1990xxERAv15n16p36795].

 

11.    Estimating the concentration of uranium in some environmental samples in Kuwait after the 1991 Gulf War, by F Bou-Rabee, Dept. of Geology, Kuwait Univ, Safat, Kuwait.  Appl. Radiat. Isot. Vol. 46(4), 1995 (pp. 217-220).

Soil and air samples in Kuwait have been analyzed using ICP-MS. Avg. U in soil samples is 0.7 microgram/gram, half that of solid fall-out and air particulate matter samples. Total per capita annual intake of U via inhalation was appraised to be about 0.05 Bq, less than 0.2% of max. allowed annual intak for general population.

[BouRabee1995xxARIv46n4p217].

 

12.    Mobilization and transport of depleted uranium in surface waters, by PN Graham, et al., Georgia Inst. of Tech., Atlanta, GA.  212th ACS Nat’l Meeting Abstracts, Aug. 25, 1996.

A model using experimental oxidation and dissolution rate equations is developed to determine long-range potential for DU transport.

[Graham1996xxACSNMA].

 

13.    Environmental impact of the NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia, by IE Sitaras, et al., Dept. Chem., Natl. and Capodistrian Univ., Athens, Greece.  Chemika Chronika, Genike Ekdose Vol. 61(6), 1999 (pp. 180-184).

Sources and health impacts of organic pollutants and DU resulting from NATO air strikes are examined, with attempts at estimating their transport and future dispersion in the environment.

[Sitaras1999xxCCGEv61n6p180).

 

14.    After the dust settles, by S Fetter, et al., The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 55, 1999, (pp. 42-45).

The authors conclude that radiological effects from DU exposure will be minor, but people exposed to vehicles hit by DU munitions, their rescuers, and individuals who spent prolonged time in the vehicles as part of cleanup details without adequate respiratory protection could be at high risk for heavy-metal toxicity from inhalation of DU dust.

[Fetter1999xxBASv55nxp42].

 

15.    Uranium in the environment, (in Serbian), by GD Duric, et al., Univ. of Belgrade, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.  Hemijska Industrija Vol. 54(2), 2000 (pp. 50-52).

A review with 20 references with emphasis on determining an appropriate “zero state” biological reference in order to assess risks and damage that may be caused by future environmental contamination from DU.

[Duric2000xxHIv54n2p50].

 

16.    Assessment of the environmental radioactive contamination levels by depleted uranium after a war, by S Pavlovic, et al., VINCA Inst. of Nuclear Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.  Bilten Instituta za Nuklearne Nauke Vinca Vol. 5(1to4), 2000 (pp. 25-31).

Radioactivity analysis of food, drinking water, etc. were carried out following wartime assault with DU weapons.

[Pavlovic2000xxBINNVv5n1to4p25].

 

17.    Evaluating the risk from depleted uranium after the Boeing 747-258F crash in Amsterdam, 1992, by PA Uijt de Haag, et al., RIVM, P.O. Box 1, 3720 BA, Bilthoven, Netherlands. paul.uijt.de.haag@rivm.nl   J Hazard Mater. Vol. 76(1), Aug. 2000 (pp. 39-58).

On 4 October 1992, a large cargo plane crashed into an apartment building in the Bijlmermeer quarter of Amsterdam. In the years following the accident, an increasing number of people started reporting health complaints, which they attributed to exposure to dangerous substances after the crash. Since the aircraft had been carrying depleted uranium as counterbalance weights and about 150 kg uranium had been found missing after clearance of the crash site, exposure to uranium oxide particles was pointed out as the possible cause of their health complaints.Six years after the accident, a risk analysis was therefore carried out to investigate whether the health complaints could be attributed to exposure to uranium oxide set free during the accident. The scientific challenge was to come up with reliable results, knowing that - considering the late date - virtually no data were available to validate any calculated result. The source term of uranium was estimated using both generic and specific data. Various dispersion models were applied in combination with the local setting and the meteorological conditions at the time of the accident to estimate the exposure of bystanders during the fire caused by the crash. Emphasis was given to analysing the input parameters, inter-comparing the various models and comparing model results with the scarce information available.Uranium oxide formed in the fire has a low solubility, making the chemical toxicity to humans less important than the radiotoxicity. Best-estimate results indicated that bystanders may have been exposed to a radiation dose of less than 1 microSv, whereas a worst-case approach indicated an upper limit of less than 1 mSv. This value is considerably less than the radiation dose for which acute effects are to be expected. It is therefore considered to be improbable that the missing uranium had indeed led to the health complaints reported.

 [UijtdeHaag200008JHMv76n1p39]. (PMID: 10863013 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

18.    Did NATO attacks in Yugoslavia cause a detectable environmental effect in Hungary?, by A Kerekes, et al., Frederic Joliot-Curie National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene, Budapest, Hungary. kerekes@hp.osski.hu  Health Phys. Vol. 80(2), Feb. 2001 (pp. 177-178).

Because of the intensive NATO bombardment of the neighboring region to Hungary, i.e., Vojvodina, North Yugoslavia, air monitoring for detection of depleted uranium particles supposed to be used as a component of bullets was extended to the Southern region of the country. Alpha spectrometry was applied as a sensitive analytical technique able to detect uranium. Though no depleted uranium was detected in air by the sensitive technique of alpha-spectrometry, the increased uranium content in natural ratio as a component of normal soil, natural gas, etc., is suggested to originate from well dispersed dust (2.5 microm size) emitted to the atmosphere by explosions during bombing. This observation is supported by the geographical distribution and the relatively rapid decrease of pollution after the bomb attacks ceased.

 [Kerekes200102HPv80n2p177]. (PMID: 11197468 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

19.    Levels of depleted uranium in Kosovo soils, by U Sansone, et al., ANPA-Agenzia Nazionale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente, Italian National Environmental Protection Agency, Rome. sansone@anpa.it.  Radiat Prot Dosimetry. Vol. 97(4), 2001 (pp. 317-320).

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has performed a field survey at 11 sites located in Kosovo, where depleted uranium (DU) ammunitions were used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the last Balkans conflict (1999). Soil sampling was performed to assess the spread of DU ground contamination around and within the NATO target sites and the migration of DU along the soil profile. The 234U/238U and 235U/238U activity concentration ratios have been used as an indicator of natural against anthropogenic sources of uranium. The results show that levels of 238U activity concentrations in soils above 100 Bq x kg(-1) can be considered a 'tracer' of the presence of DU in soils. The results also indicate that detectable ground surface contamination by DU is limited to areas within a few metres from localised points of concentrated contamination caused by penetrator impacts. Vertical distribution of DU along the soil profile is measurable up to a depth of 10-20 cm. This latter aspect is of particular relevance for the potential risk of future contamination of groundwater.

 [Sansone2001xxRPDv97n4p317]. (PMID: 11878410 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

20.    Estimation of depleted uranium aerosol distribution through the atmosphere after hitting of a solid target by ammunition, in Serbian, by Z Grsic. Hemijska Industrija Vol. 55(7-8), 2001 (pp. 335-338).

Using a Gaussian “puff” trajectory diffusion model, the effects of meteorological conditions was demonstrated.

[Grsic2001xxHIv55n7to8p335].

 

21.    Estimation of consequences to the population and the environment due to the use of ammunition with depleted uranium in Yugoslavia, in Serbian,  by M Orlic.  Hemijska Industrija Vol. 55(7-8), 2001 (pp. 349-357).

[Orlic2001xxHIv55n7to8p349].

 

22.    Optimization and application of ICP-MS and alpha spectrometry for determination of isotopic ratios of depleted uranium and plutonium in samples collected in Kosovo, by SF Boulyga, et al., Research Center Juelich, Juelich, Germany. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectroscopy Vol. 16(11), 2001 (pp. 1283-1289).

The limits of quantification for U-236 and Pu-239 using these two methods was 0.6 pg/liter (aq. soln.) and 0.13 pg/gram (soil). DU was detected in Kosovo soil samples, along with Pu-240, and Pu-239, (total Pu at 0.5 pg/gram), though the samples containing Pu were not the same as those containing DU, leading to the possible conclusion that the Pu detected as background contamination from nuclear testing fallout and from the Chernobyl accident of 1986. However, Plutonium, Am-241 (1.7 pg/gram), and U-236 (0.031 mg/gram) were all detected in a sample taken from a penetrator shell.

[Boulyga2001xxJAASv16n11p1283].

 

23.    Depleted uranium (DU): a holistic consideration of DU and related matters, by EI Hamilton, Phoenix Research, Marldon, Paignton, UK.   Sci Total Environ. Vol. 281(1-3), Dec. 2001 (pp. 5-21).

Following the use of depleted uranium (DU) during the Gulf and Balkan conflicts, unnecessary and costly confusion has existed for some 11 years concerning the hazard it constitutes, despite the fact that sufficient data are available to answer most of the relevant questions. In tracing the significance of uranium in the environment and humans, too much reliance is still placed upon the extrapolation of animal data. The existing radiological nomenclature is far too involved and complex to understand, let alone implement. The excellence of early health physics seems to have been lost, and hence there is a failure to utilise the large body of knowledge, and the manner in which it was obtained, in other disciplines. Health physics has failed to understand the nature of some natural processes that ultimately control radiation dose to the environment and humans. Examination of three types of DU, in particular the highly radioactive and potentially hazardous unprocessed, spent-reactor uranium fuel debris (UDU), alluded to as hot particles, has been poorly studied on the basis of scarcity in the environment. Fundamental geological processes are described which illustrate that, as a consequence of routine operation of nuclear reprocessing plants, especially in the past, and following reactor accidents, natural processes can result in an enrichment of DU particles in most types of sediment. Failure to grasp essential geological processes in relation to the dispersion of radionuclides in the environment is detrimental to public acceptance of an essential form of energy in association with others.

 [Hamilton200112STEv281n1to3p5]. (PMID: 11778960 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

24.    Radioecological survey at selected sites hit by depleted uranium ammunitions during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, by U Sansone, et al., Agenzia Nazionale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente, Rome, Italy. sansone@anpa.it.   Sci Total Environ. Vol. 281(1-3), Dec. 17, 2001 (pp. 23-35).

A field study, organised, coordinated and conducted under the responsibility of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), took place in Kosovo in November 2000 to evaluate the level of depleted uranium (DU) released into the environment by the use of DU ammunition during the 1999 conflict. Representatives of six different scientific organisations took part in the mission and a total of approximately 350 samples were collected. During this field mission, the Italian National Environmental Protection Agency (ANPA) collected water, soil, lichen and tree bark samples from different sites. The samples were analysed by alpha-spectroscopy and in some cases by inductively coupled plasma-source mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). The 234U/238U and 235U/238U activity concentration ratios were used to distinguish natural from anthropogenic uranium. This paper reports the results obtained on these samples. All water samples had very low concentrations of uranium (much below the average concentration of drinking water in Europe). The surface soil samples showed a very large variability in uranium activity concentration, namely from approximately 20 Bq kg(-1) (environmental natural uranium) to approximately 2.3 x 10(5) Bq kg(-1) (approximately 18000 mg kg(-1) of depleted uranium), with concentrations above environmental levels always due to DU. The uranium isotope measurements refer to soil samples collected at places where DU ammunition had been fired; this variability indicates that the impact of DU ammunitions is very site-specific, reflecting both the physical conditions at the time of the impact of the DU ammunition and any physical and chemical alteration which occurred since then. The results on tree barks and lichens indicated the presence of DU in all cases, showing their usefulness as sensitive qualitative bio-indicators for the presence of DU dusts or aerosols formed at the time the DU ammunition had hit a hard target. This result is particularly interesting considering that at some sites, which had been hit by DU ammunition, no DU ground contamination could be detected.

 [Sansone200112STEv281n1to3p23]. (PMID: 11778955 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

25.    Modeling of Depleted Uranium in subsurface systems, by PJ Chen, et al., Department of Chemical and Environmental Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore. Water, Air and Soil Polution, Vol. 140(1-4), 2002 (pp. 173-201).

“Equilibrium modelling studies showed that DU sorption increased sharply from 0 to 100% at pH 3.5-5.0 and max immobilization was established at pH >5. Kinetic simulations indicated that the sorption of DU in subsurface systems is a rapid process.”

  [Chen200201WASPv140n1to4p173]

 

26.    Estimates of radiological risk from depleted uranium weapons in war scenarios, by M Durante, et al.,  Department of Physics, University Federico II, Napoli, Italy. durante@na.infn.it.   Health Phys. Vol. 82(1), Jan. 2002 (pp. 14-20).

Several weapons used during the recent conflict in Yugoslavia contain depleted uranium, including missiles and armor-piercing incendiary rounds. Health concern is related to the use of these weapons, because of the heavy-metal toxicity and radioactivity of uranium. Although chemical toxicity is considered the more important source of health risk related to uranium, radiation exposure has been allegedly related to cancers among veterans of the Balkan conflict, and uranium munitions are a possible source of contamination in the environment. Actual measurements of radioactive contamination are needed to assess the risk. In this paper, a computer simulation is proposed to estimate radiological risk related to different exposure scenarios. Dose caused by inhalation of radioactive aerosols and ground contamination induced by Tomahawk missile impact are simulated using a Gaussian plume model (HOTSPOT code). Environmental contamination and committed dose to the population resident in contaminated areas are predicted by a food-web model (RESRAD code). Small values of committed effective dose equivalent appear to be associated with missile impacts (50-y CEDE < 5 mSv), or population exposure by water-independent pathways (50-y CEDE < 80 mSv). The greatest hazard is related to the water contamination in conditions of effective leaching of uranium in the groundwater (50-y CEDE < 400 mSv). Even in this worst case scenario, the chemical toxicity largely predominates over radiological risk. These computer simulations suggest that little radiological risk is associated to the use of depleted uranium weapons.

[Durante200201HPv82n1p14]. (PMID: 11768794 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

27.    Chemical and radiochemical characterization of depleted uranium (DU) in Kosovo soils, by D Desideri, et al., Centre of Applied Radiochemistry, Urbino University, Piazza Rinascimento 6, 61029 Urbino, Italy. d.desideri@uniurb.it.   Ann Chim. Vol. 92(4), Apr. 2002 (pp. 397-405).

As is well known ammunitions containing depleted uranium (DU) were used by NATO during the Balkan war. The paper deals with the determination of uranium alpha emitting radiosotopes in Kosovo soils by chemical separation and alpha spectrometry. The samples were collected by CISAM (Centro Interforze Studi ed Applicazioni Militari, S. Piero a Grado, Livorno) in the period November 1999-April 2000. The DU distribution in soil appeared very disomogeneous; the isotope weight percentages for U-238, U-235 and U-234 resulted 99.76, 0.24 and 7.24.10(-4) respectively; consequently the activity distribution was 86.42%, 1.31%, 11.63% and the isotope ratios were 1.52.10(-2) and 0.134 for U-235/U-238 and U-234/U-238 showing clearly the presence of DU. A small peak at 4.49 MeV (U-236) in the alpha spectrum indicated that the used DU was the by-product of exhausted uranium reprocessing. In order to determine the chemical and physiological solubility of uranium a fractionation study was carried out by using the Tessier method: 55% of uranium showed a fair solubility, but 45% was solubilized only by 8 M HNO3.

[Desideri200204Acv92n4p397]. (PMID: 12073885 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

28.    Depleted uranium in military conflicts and the impact on the environment, by C Papastefanou, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Nuclear Physics Department, Greece. papastefanou@physics.auth.gr.  Health Phys. Vol. 83(2), Aug. 2002 (pp. 280-282).

Kosovo was bombarded by fired shells (bullets) with depleted uranium (DU) during April 1999. Around 30,000 depleted uranium rounds (projectiles) were fired, and about 10 tons of the DU debris were scattered across Kosovo. In reviewing the data on environmental measurements for depleted uranium collected by field missions in the Kosovo area during the period of 5-19 November 2000 (1.5 y following the 1999 conflict), evidence of depleted uranium was found only in soil samples at localized points of concentrated contamination. Concentrations varied from a few mg (2.34 mg) DU per kg soil (29 Bq DU/kg soil) at depths of 39.5-44.5 cm up to about 18 g DU per kg soil (225,760 Bq DU/kg soil) at depths of 0-5 cm surface soil. There were no signs of depleted uranium in waters. However, in most (80%) of the 145 soil (core) samples reported by UNEP, 238U was lower than 100 Bq per kg soil (the lowest was 8.8 Bq per kg soil) in 112 locations of widespread contamination.

[Papastefanou200208HPv83n2p280]. (PMID: 12132716 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

29.    Depleted uranium in Kosovo: results of a survey by gamma spectrometry on soil samples, by J Uyttenhove, et al., Ghent University, Physics Lab, Gent, Belgium. jozef.uyttenhove@rug.ac.be.   Health Phys. Vol. 83(4), Oct. 2002 (pp. 543-548).

The presence of depleted uranium in the soil of former Yugoslavia after the 1999 conflict raised great public concern all over the world. The so-called Balkan-syndrome is often linked with depleted uranium contamination. An excellent compilation of data about DU and its possible impact on health and environment can be found in the 1999 UNEP report and publications from the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute. Unfortunately, very few systematic and reliable data on the possible depleted uranium concentrations were until now available. Some of these rare data are only available on the web, without adequate information about the experimental procedure used. To clarify the situation, a systematic survey was started in the summer of 2000 as a collaborative effort between Ghent University (Physics Laboratory) and the Belgian Ministry of Defense (Medical Service). From 50 sites selected all over Kosovo, 150 soil samples were measured in the laboratory with a high-resolution gamma-spectrometer. Some sites (14) were explicitly selected based on military information on the use of depleted uranium munitions in the vicinity. After careful analysis we can conclude that there is no indication of any depleted uranium contamination on these 50 sites with a minimal detectable activity of 15 Bq; this corresponds approximately to 1 mg depleted uranium in a typical sample (100-150 g).

[Uyttenhove200210HPv83n4p543]. (PMID: 12240731 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE])

 

30.    Characterisation and dissolution of depleted uranium aerosols produced during impacts of kinetic energy penetrators against a tank, by V Chazel, et al., Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, Departement de Protection de la Sante de l'Homme et de Dosimetrie, Service de Dosimetrie, LEAR, BP 166, F 26702 Pierrelatte Cedex, France. valerie.chazel@irsn.fr.  Radiat Prot Dosimetry Vol. 105 (1-4), 2003 (pp. 163-166).

Aerosols produced during impacts of depleted uranium (DU) penetrators against the glacis (sloping armour) and the turret of a tank were sampled. The concentration and size distribution were determined. Activity median aerodynamic diameters were 1 microm (geometric standard deviation, sigma(g) = 3.7) and 2 microm (sigma(g) = 2.5), respectively, for glacis and turret. The mean air concentration was 120 Bq m(-3), i.e. 8.5 mg m(-3) of DU. Filters analysed by scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and X ray diffraction showed two types of particles (fine particles and large molten particles) composed mainly of a mixture of uranium and aluminium. The uranium oxides were mostly U3O8, UO2.25 and probably UO3.01 and a mixed compound of U and Al. The kinetics of dissolution in three media (HCO3-, HCl and Gamble's solution) were determined using in-vitro tests. The slow dissolution rates were respectively slow, and intermediate between slow and moderate, and the rapid dissolution fractions were mostly intermediate between moderate and fast. According to the in-vitro results for Gamble's solution, and based on a hypothetical single acute inhalation of 90 Bq, effective doses integrated up to 1 y after incorporation were 0.54 and 0.56 mSv, respectively, for aerosols from glacis and turret. In comparison, the ICRP limits are 20 mSv y(-1) for workers and 1 mSv y(-1) for members of the public. A kidney concentration of approximately 0.1 microg U g(-1) was predicted and should not, in this case, lead to kidney damage.

[Chazel2003xxRPDv105n1to4p163]. (PMID: 14526949 [PubMed - in process]).

 

31.    Measuring aerosols generated inside armoured vehicles perforated by depleted uranium ammunition, by MA Parkhurst, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, PO Box 999, Richland, WA 99352, USA. maryann.parkhurst@pnl.gov.   Radiat Prot Dosimetry Vol. 105(1-4), 2003 (pp. 167-170).

In response to questions raised after the Gulf War about the health significance of exposure to depleted uranium (DU), the US Department of Defense initiated a study designed to provide an improved scientific basis for assessment of possible health effects on soldiers in vehicles struck by these munitions. As part of this study, a series of DU penetrators were fired at an Abrams tank and a Bradley fighting vehicle, and the aerosols generated by vehicle perforation were collected and characterised. A robust sampling system was designed to collect aerosols in this difficult environment and monitor continuously the sampler flow rates. The aerosol samplers selected for these tests included filter cassettes, cascade impactors, a five-stage cyclone and a moving filter. Sampler  redundancy was an integral part of the sampling system to offset losses from fragment damage. Wipe surveys and deposition trays collected removable deposited particulate matter. Interior aerosols were analysed for uranium concentration and particle size distribution as a function of time. They were also analysed for uranium oxide phases, particle morphology and dissolution in vitro. These data, currently under independent peer review, will provide input for future prospective and retrospective dose and health risk assessments of inhaled or ingested DU aerosols. This paper briefly discusses the target vehicles, firing trajectories, aerosol samplers and instrumentation control systems, and the types of analyses conducted on the samples.

 [Parkhurst2003xxRPDv105n1to4p167]. (PMID: 14526950 [PubMed - in process]).

 

32.    Isotopic composition and origin of uranium and plutonium in selected soil samples collected in Kosovo, by PR Danesi, et al., International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Seibersdorf Laboratories, Wagramer Strasse 5, PO Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. P.R.Danesi@iaea.org.   J Environ Radioact. Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 121-131).

Soil samples collected from locations in Kosovo where depleted uranium (DU) ammunition was expended during the 1999 Balkan conflict were analysed for uranium and plutonium isotopes content (234U, 235U, 236U, 238U, 238Pu, (239 + 240)Pu). The analyses were conducted using gamma spectrometry (235U, 238U), alpha spectrometry (238Pu, (239 + 240)Pu), inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) (234U, 235U, 236U, 238U) and accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) (236U)). The results indicated that whenever the U concentration exceeded the normal environmental values (approximately 2 to 3 mg/kg) the increase was due to DU contamination. 236U was also present in the released DU at a constant ratio of 236U (mg/kg)/238U (mg/kg) = 2.6 x 10(-5), indicating that the DU used in the ammunition was from a batch that had been irradiated and then reprocessed. The plutonium concentration in the soil (undisturbed) was about 1 Bq/kg and, on the basis of the measured 238Pu/(239 + 240)Pu, could be entirely attributed to the fallout of the nuclear weapon tests of the 1960s (no appreciable contribution from DU).

[Danesi2003xxJERv64n2to3p121]. ( PMID: 12500799 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

33.    Characterisation of projectiles composed of depleted uranium, by R Pollanen, et al., STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, 00881 Helsinki, Finland. roy.pollanen@stuk.fi.  J Environ Radioact. Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 133-142).

Projectiles suspected to be composed of depleted uranium (DU) were found in Kosovo. Their properties were analysed using alpha and gamma ray spectrometry, mass spectrometry and electron microscopy. They were found to be composed of DU with small amounts of other elements such as Ti. 236U was detected in the penetrators, reflecting the use of reprocessed fuel. No transuranium elements were detected. The typical external dose rate meter is not the best option for mapping the location of penetrators from the ground. Monte Carlo calculations were performed in estimating possible skin doses. Penetrators in long-lasting contact with skin may cause a notable equivalent dose to skin.

[Pollanen2003xxJERv64n2to3p133]. (PMID: 12500800 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

34.    Depleted Uranium particles in selected Kosovo samples, by PR Danesi, et al.,  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Seibersdorf Laboratories, IAEA, Vienna, Austria. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 143-154).

Selected soil samples, collected in Kosovo locations where DU ammunition was expended during the 1999 Balkan conflic, have been investigated by secondary ion mass spectroscopy (SIMS), X-ray fluorescence imaging using a mico-beam (micro-XRF) and scanning electron microscopy equipped with an energy dispersive X-ray fluorescence detector (SEM-EDXRF), with the objective to test the suitability of these techniques to identify the presence of small DU particles and measure their size distribution and the 235U/238U isotope ratio (SIMS). Although the results do not permit any legitimate extrapolation to all the sites hit by the DU rounds used during the conflict, they indicated that there can be “spots” where hundreds of thousands of particles may be present in a few milligrams of DU contaminated soil. The particle size distribution showed that most of the DU particles were <5 micrometer in diameter and more than 50% of the particles had a diameter <1.5 micrometer. Knowledge of DU particles is needed as a basis for the assessment of the potential environmental and health impacts of military use of DU, since it provides information on possible re-suspension and inhalation.

[Danesi200302JERv64n2p143] ( PMID: 12500801 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

35.    Actinide analysis of a depleted uranium penetrator from a 1999 target site in southern Serbia, by JP McLaughlin, et al., Department of Experimental Physics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. james.mclaughlin@ucd.ie.  J Environ Radioact. Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 155-165).

Following the detection of 236U in depleted uranium (DU) ammunition used during the Balkans conflict in the 1990s, concern has been expressed about the possibility that other nuclides from the nuclear fuel cycle and, in particular, transuranium nuclides, might be present in this type of ammunition. In this paper, we report the results of uranium and plutonium analyses carried out on a depleted uranium penetrator recovered from a target site in southern Serbia. Our data show the depleted nature of the uranium and confirm the presence of trace amounts of plutonium in the penetrator. The activity concentration of (239+240)PU, at 45.4+/-0.7 Bq kg(-1), is the highest reported to date for any penetrator recovered from the Balkans. This concentration, however, is comparable to that expected to be present naturally in uranium ores and, from a radiological perspective, would only give rise to a very small increase in dose to exposed persons compared to that from the DU itself.

[McLaughlin2003xxJERv64n2to3p155]. (PMID: 12500802 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

36.    Oxidation states of uranium in DU particles from Kosovo, B by Salbu B, et al., Isotope Laboratory, Department of Soil and Water Sciences, Agricultural University of Norway, P.O. Box 5028, N-1432 As, Norway. brit.salbu@ijvf.nlh.no.   J Environ Radioact. Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 167-173.

The oxidation states of uranium contained in depleted uranium (DU) particles were determined by synchrotron radiation based micro-XANES, applied to individual particles in soil samples collected at Ceja Mountain, Kosovo. Based on scanning electron microscopy (SEM) with XRMA prior to micro-XANES, DU particles ranging from submicrons to about 30 microm (average size: 2 microm or less) were identified. Compared to well-defined standards, all investigated DU particles were oxidized. About 50% of the DU particles were characterized as UO2, the remaining DU particles present were U3O8 or a mixture of oxidized forms (ca. 2/3 UO2, 1/3 U3O8). Since the particle weathering rate is expected to be higher for U3O8 than for UO2, the presence of respiratory U3O8 and UO2 particles, their corresponding weathering rates and subsequent remobilisation of U from DU particles should be included in the environmental or health impact assessments.

 [Salbu2003xxJERv64n2to3p167]. (PMID: 12500803 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

37.        Uranium ores and depleted uranium in the environment, with a reference to uranium in the biosphere from the Erzgebirge/Sachsen, Germany, by A Meinrath, et al.,  Klinikum, Bischof-Pilgrim Str.1, 94032 Passau, FRG, Germany. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 175-193).

The Erzgebirge (‘Ore Mountains’) area in the eastern part of Germany was a major source of uranium for Soviet nuclear programs between 1945 and 1989. During this time, the former German Democratic Republic became the third larges uranium producer in the world. The high abundance of uranium in the geological formations of the Erzgebirge are mirrored in the discovery of uranium by M. Klaproth close to Freiberg City in 1789 and the description of the so-called ‘Schneeberg’ disease, lung cancer caused in minors by the accumulation of the uranium decay product, radon, in the subsurfaces of shafts. Since 1991, remediation and mitigation of uranium at production facilities, rock piles and mill tailings has taken place. In parallel, efforts were initiated to assess the likely adverse effects of uranium mining to humans. The costs of these activities amount to about 6.5 billion Euro. A comparison of depleted uranium at certain sites is given.

 [Meinrath200300JERv64n2p175]. ( PMID: 12500804 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

38.    Use of HPGe gamma-ray spectrometry to assess the isotopic composition of urnanium in soils, by CA Papachristodoulou, et al.  Nuclear Physics Laboratory, Dept. of Physics, The University of Ioannina, 45110 Ioannina, Greece. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 64(2-3), 2003 (pp 195-203).

Gamma-ray spectrometry was used to determine uranium activity and investigate the presence of depleted uranium in soil samples collected from camping sites of the Greek expeditionary force in Kosovo. Assessment of 238U concentrations was based on measurements of the 63.3 keV and 92.38 keV emissions of its first daughter nuclide, 234Th. To determine the isotopic ratio of 238U/235U, secular equilibrium along the two radioactive series was first ensured and thereby the contribution of 235U under the 186 keV peak was deduced. The uranium activity in the samples varied from 48 to 112 Bq kg(-1), whereas the activity ratio of 238U/235U averaged 23.1 +/-4.3.

[Papachristodoulou200302JERv64n2p195]. (PMID: 12500805 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

39.    Depleted uranium residual radiological risk assessment for Kosovo sites., by M Durante, et al., Department of Physics, University Federico II, Monte S. Angelo, Via Cintia, 80126 Napoli, Italy. durante@na.infn.it  J Environ Radioact. Vol. 64(2-3), 2003 (pp. 237-45).

During the recent conflict in Yugoslavia, depleted uranium rounds were employed and were left in the battlefield. Health concern is related to the risk arising from contamination of areas in Kosovo with depleted uranium penetrators and dust. Although chemical toxicity is the most significant health risk related to uranium, radiation exposure has been allegedly related to cancers among veterans of the Balkan conflict. Uranium munitions are considered to be a source of radiological contamination of the environment. Based on measurements and estimates from the recent Balkan Task Force UNEP mission in Kosovo, we have estimated effective doses to resident populations using a well-established food-web mathematical model (RESRAD code). The UNEP mission did not find any evidence of widespread contamination in Kosovo. Rather than the actual measurements, we elected to use a desk assessment scenario (Reference Case) proposed by the UNEP group as the source term for computer simulations. Specific applications to two Kosovo sites (Planeja village and Vranovac hill) are described. Results of the simulations suggest that radiation doses from water-independent pathways are negligible (annual doses below 30 microSv). A small radiological risk is expected from contamination of the groundwater in conditions of effective leaching and low distribution coefficient of uranium metal. Under the assumptions of the Reference Case, significant radiological doses (>1 mSv/year) might be achieved after many years from the conflict through water-dependent pathways. Even in this worst-case scenario, DU radiological risk would be far overshadowed by its chemical toxicity.

[Durante2003xxJERv64n2to3p237]. (PMID: 12500808 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE])

 

40.    Lichens as biomonitors of uranium in the Balkan area, by S Loppi, et al., Department of Environmental Science, University of Siena, Italy. loppi@unisi.it  Environ Pollut. Vol. 125(2), 2003 (pp. 277-280).

The contribution of the conflict of 1999 to the environmental levels of uranium in the Balkan area was evaluated by means of lichens used as biomonitors. The average U concentration found in lichens in the present study was in line with the values reported for lichens from other countries and well below the levels found in lichens collected in areas with natural or anthropogenic sources of U. Measurement of isotopic ratios 235U/238U allowed to exclude the presence of depleted uranium. According to these results, we could not detect widespread environmental contamination by depleted uranium in the Balkan area.

 [Loppi2003xxEPv235n2p277]. ( PMID: 12810321 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

41.    Modeling of the dispersion of depleted uranium aerosol, by C Mitsakou, et al., Institute of Nuclear Technology-Radiation Protection, N.C.S.R. Demokritos, 15310 Ag. Paraskevi, Attiki, Greece. Health Phys. Vol. 84(4), 2003 (pp. 538-544).

Depleted uranium is a low-cost radioactive material that, in addition to other applications, is used by the military in kinetic energy weapons against armored vehicles. During the Gulf and Balkan conflicts concern has been raised about the potential health hazards arising from the toxic and radioactive material released. The aerosol produced during impact and combustion of depleted uranium munitions can potentially contaminate wide areas around the impact sites or can be inhaled by civilians and military personnel. Attempts to estimate the extent and magnitude of the dispersion were until now performed by complex modeling tools employing unclear assumptions and input parameters of high uncertainty. An analytical puff model accommodating diffusion with simultaneous deposition is developed, which can provide a reasonable estimation of the dispersion of the released depleted uranium aerosol. Furthermore, the period of the exposure for a given point downwind from the release can be estimated (as opposed to when using a plume model). The main result is that the depleted uranium mass is deposited very close to the release point. The deposition flux at a couple of kilometers from the release point is more than one order of magnitude lower than the one a few meters near the release point. The effects due to uncertainties in the key input variables are addressed. The most influential parameters are found to be atmospheric stability, height of release, and wind speed, whereas aerosol size distribution is less significant. The output from the analytical model developed was tested against the numerical model RPM-AERO. Results display satisfactory agreement between the two models.

[Mitsakou200304HPv84n4p538]. (PMID: 12705453 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

42.       Environmental and health consequences of depleted uranium use in the 1991 Gulf War, by Bem H, et al., Institute of Applied Radiation, Technical University of Lodz, ul. Zwirki 36, 90-924, Lodz, Poland. henrybem@ck-sg.p.lodz.pl . Environ Int. Vol. 30 (1), March 2004 (pp. 123-134).

Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of the 235U radionuclide enrichment processes for nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. DU in the metallic form has high density and hardness as well as pyrophoric properties, which makes it superior to the classical tungsten armour-piercing munitions. Military use of DU has been recently a subject of considerable concern, not only to radioecologists but also public opinion in terms of possible health hazards arising from its radioactivity and chemical toxicity. In this review, the results of uranium content measurements in different environmental samples performed by authors in Kuwait after Gulf War are presented with discussion concerning possible environmental and health effects for the local population. It was found that uranium concentration in the surface soil samples ranged from 0.3 to 2.5 microg g(-1) with an average value of 1.1 microg g(-1), much lower than world average value of 2.8 microg g(-1). The solid fallout samples showed similar concentrations varied from 0.3 to 1.7 microg g(-1) (average 1.47 microg g(-1)). Only the average concentration of U in solid particulate matter in surface air equal to 0.24 ng g(-1) was higher than the usually observed values of approximately 0.1 ng g(-1) but it was caused by the high dust concentration in the air in that region. Calculated on the basis of these measurements, the exposure to uranium for the Kuwait and southern Iraq population does not differ from the world average estimation. Therefore, the widely spread information in newspapers and Internet (see for example: [CADU NEWS, 2003. http://www.cadu.org.uk/news/index.htm (3-13)]) concerning dramatic health deterioration for Iraqi citizens should not be linked directly with their exposure to DU after the Gulf War. [Bem200403EIv30n1p123] (PMID: 14664872 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

43.     Measurements of environmental background radiation at location of coal-fired power plants, by Adrovic F, et al., Prishtina University, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Filipa Visnjica b. b., Kosovska Mitrovica. Radiat Prot Dosimetry. Vol. 112 (3), 2004 (pp. 439-442).

Environmental radiation monitoring in the vicinity of coal-fired power plants which are used primarily to determine the variability in measured background exposures are presented in this article; this is in order to estimate the contribution due to the plants' operation. Measurements have been done using a multi-element, high sensitive dosemeter system composed of three solid, properly filtered, sintered CaSO4:Dy thermoluminescent detectors, and one low-atomic number, MgB4O7:Dy,Na thermoluminiscencent detector produced at the Vinca Institute. The dosemeters were deployed quarterly 1 m above ground level at locations within 20 km of the power plants. Twenty urban and suburban measured stations were established. Measurements were carried out over one year period, from the beginning of the summer of 1995 to the end of the spring of 1996. The registered annual absorbed dose in air, from all of the 20 stations, vary from 0.91 to 1.46 mGy a(-1). One of the highest values of the annual absorbed dose was measured at the station near to the plant, i.e. at the place the most exposed to the lighter fly ash from the plant stack, as it was expected. The annual absorbed dose registered at the measuring stations that were selected as a control because they were situated practically away from possible influence of the plants were from 0.91 to 0.98 mGy a(-1). The above values of absorbed doses become very important, by concurrence of the circumstances, because they represent the zero background radiation level before the incidence of depleted uranium over former Yougoslav territory in the Kosovo region in the spring of 1999. These measured absorbed dose exposures have to be compared with corresponding absorbed dose rates from the natural sources, such as soil having an exposure of 18-93 nGy h(-1) (average 35 nGy h(-1)) according to the UNSCEAR 2000 Report. This investigation has been primarily done in order to check the impact of coal-fired power plants on the background radiation level in its vicinity. According to the experimental results, influence was confirmed both qualitatively and quantitatively. [Adrovic2004xxRPDv112n3p439] (PMID: 15385680 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

44.     Analysis of uranium and isotopic ratio measurement in fish and marine invertebrates from the North Adriatic Sea by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, by Bettinelli M, et al., Laboratory of Environmental Hygiene and Industrial Toxicology, Salvatore Maugeri Foundation, via Ferrata 8, Pavia, Italy. mbettinelli@fsm.it . Rapid Commun Mass Spectrom. Vol. 18 (4), 2004 (pp. 465-468).

Uranium analysis in fish, echinoderms and shellfish samples collected in the north part of the Adriatic Sea is presented. The aim of the work was to evaluate uranium concentrations in samples of this kind, and also to investigate possible contamination from depleted uranium (DU) in consequence of the war operations previously conducted in that area. DU contamination was checked by measuring the (235)U/(238)U isotope ratio. The samples were dissolved according to the EPA 3052 procedure, and the determinations were performed by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS), optimized in order to perform isotope ratio measurements with good precision. The method was validated by evaluating the recovery from spiked samples; results in the range 93-107% were obtained. The isotope ratio measurement was evaluated in terms of accuracy and precision by analyzing the certified reference materials IAEA 326 and GBW 07305, and good agreement with the certified values was obtained here also. The concentration of uranium was higher in invertebrate samples than in fish (0.3-2 microg/g of U vs. 0.05-0.1 microg/g, respectively). The isotope ratio measurements for all the samples gave values very similar to the natural ratio, permitting exclusion of the presence of DU. [Bettinelli2004xxRCMSv18n4p465] (PMID: 14966854 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

45.       Environmental distribution of uranium and other trace elements at selected Kosovo sites, by Di Lella LA, et al., Dipartimento di Scienze Ambientali G. Sarfatti, Universita di Siena, Via P.A. Mattioli 4, I-53100 Siena, Italy. Chemosphere Vol. 56 (9), Sept. 2004 (pp. 861-865).

This paper reports the results of a study using lichens as biomonitors to investigate the environmental distribution of uranium and other trace elements at selected Kosovo sites. The results suggested that the use of depleted uranium (DU) ammunitions in Kosovo did not cause a diffuse environmental contamination in such a way to have caused a detectable U enrichment in lichens. Also isotopic (235)U/(238)U measurements did not indicate the presence of DU particles in lichens. The present results also provided no indication of intense environmental contamination by the other trace elements analyzed, with the exception of Kosovska Mitrovica, where a diffuse environmental contamination by several heavy elements such as Pb, Zn, As and Cd was found. [DiLella200409Cv56n9p861] (PMID: 15261532 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

46.       Uranium contents and (235)U/(238)U atom ratios in soil and earthworms in western Kosovo after the 1999 war, by
Di Lella LA, et al., Dipartimento di Scienze Ambientali "G. Sarfatti"-Sezione di Geochimica Ambientale, University of Siena, Via del Laterino 8, I-53100, Siena, Italy. Sci Total Environ. Vol. 337 (1-3), Jan. 2005 (pp. 109-118).

The uranium content and (235)U/(238)U atom ratio were determined in soils and earthworms of an area of Kosovo (Djakovica garrison), heavily shelled with depleted uranium (DU) ammunition during the 1999 war. The aim of the study was to reconstruct the small-scale distribution of uranium and assess the influence of the DU added to the surface environment. The total uranium concentration and the (235)U/(238)U ratio of topsoils showed great variability and were inversely correlated. The highest uranium levels (up to 31.47 mg kg(-1)) and lowest (235)U/(238)U ratios (minimum 0.002147) were measured in topsoils collected inside, or very close to, the clusters of DU penetrator holes. Regarding the fractionation of uranium in the surface soils, the uranium concentrations in the soluble and exchangeable fractions increased as the total uranium concentration of the topsoils increased. High and rather uniform percentage contents of uranium (24-36%) were associated with the poorly crystalline iron oxide phases of soils. In the U-enriched soils the elevated levels of the element were probably due to the presence of very small, unevenly distributed oxidized DU particles. The total uranium concentration in earthworms was in the range 0.142-0.656 mg kg(-1), with the highest concentrations in Lumbricus terrestris. The juveniles of all three studied species seemed to accumulate uranium more than adults, probably due to age-related differences in metabolism. The (235)U/(238)U ratio in the earthworms was variable (0.005241-0.007266) and independent of both the total uranium contents in soils and the absolute uranium levels in the animals. Bioconcentration was greater at lower U concentrations in soil, probably due to an increasing rate of elimination of uranium by the earthworms as the soil contents of the element increase. The results of this study clearly indicate that DU was added to the soil of the study area. Nevertheless, the phenomenon was very limited spatially and the total uranium concentrations fell within the natural range of the element in soils. Moreover, the absolute uranium concentrations indicate that there was no contamination of the earthworm species studied. [DiLella200501STEv337n1to3p109] (PMID: 15626383 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

47.     Oxidation states of uranium in depleted uranium particles from Kuwait, by Salbu B,et al., Department of Plant and Environmental Sciences, Isotope Laboratory, Agricultural University of Norway, P.O. Box 5028, 1432 Aas, Norway. brit.salbu@ipm.nlh.no . J Environ Radioact. Vol. 78 (2), 2005 (pp. 125-135).

The oxidation states of uranium in depleted uranium (DU) particles were determined by synchrotron radiation based mu-XANES, applied to individual particles isolated from selected samples collected at different sites in Kuwait. Based on scanning electron microscopy with X-ray microanalysis prior to mu-XANES, DU particles ranging from submicrons to several hundred micrometers were observed. The median particle size depended on sources and sampling sites; small-sized particles (median 13 microm) were identified in swipes taken from the inside of DU penetrators holes in tanks and in sandy soil collected below DU penetrators, while larger particles (median 44 microm) were associated with fire in a DU ammunition storage facility. Furthermore, the (236)U/(235)U ratios obtained from accelerator mass spectrometry demonstrated that uranium in the DU particles originated from reprocessed fuel (about 10(-2) in DU from the ammunition facility, about 10(-3) for DU in swipes). Compared to well-defined standards, all investigated DU particles were oxidized. Uranium particles collected from swipes were characterized as UO(2), U(3)O(8) or a mixture of these oxidized forms, similar to that observed in DU affected areas in Kosovo. Uranium particles formed during fire in the DU ammunition facility were, however, present as oxidation state +5 and +6, with XANES spectra similar to solid uranyl standards. Environmental or health impact assessments for areas affected by DU munitions should therefore take into account the presence of respiratory UO(2), U(3)O(8) and even UO(3) particles, their corresponding weathering rates and the subsequent mobilisation of U from oxidized DU particles. [Salbu2005xxJERv78n2p125] (PMID: 15511555 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

48.     Radioactivity of the soil in Vojvodina (northern province of Serbia and Montenegro), by Bikit I, et al., Department of Physics, Faculty of Sciences, University of Novi Sad, Trg D. Obradovica 4, 21 000 Novi Sad, Yugoslavia. bikit@im.ns.ac.yu . J Environ Radioact. Vol. 78 (1), 2005 (pp. 11-19).

The widespread public belief that during the bombardment of Vojvodina (Yugoslavia) this region was contaminated by depleted uranium has recently raised public concern with respect to the potential contamination of agricultural products due to soil radioactivity. Based on the gamma-spectrometric analysis of 50 soil samples taken from the region of Vojvodina we concluded that there is no increase of radioactivity that could endanger the food production. Taking into account the transfer factors of 137Cs to plants, the measured activity concentrations of this isotope should not endanger the health safety of the produced food. No traces of depleted uranium have been found. The natural radioactivity levels are compared with the results form other countries. [Bikit2005xxJERv78n1p11] (PMID: 15465176 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]).

 

49.       Using a probabilistic approach in an ecological risk assessment simulation tool: test case for depleted uranium (DU), by Fan M, et al.,
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, NJ 07102, USA. Chemosphere, Vol. 60 (1) June, 2005 (pp. 111-125).

A probabilistic approach was applied in an ecological risk assessment (ERA) to characterize risk and address uncertainty employing Monte Carlo simulations for assessing parameter and risk probabilistic distributions. This simulation tool (ERA) includes a Window's based interface, an interactive and modifiable database management system (DBMS) that addresses a food web at trophic levels, and a comprehensive evaluation of exposure pathways. To illustrate this model, ecological risks from depleted uranium (DU) exposure at the US Army Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) and Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) were assessed and characterized. Probabilistic distributions showed that at YPG, a reduction in plant root weight is considered likely to occur (98% likelihood) from exposure to DU; for most terrestrial animals, likelihood for adverse reproduction effects ranges from 0.1% to 44%. However, for the lesser long-nosed bat, the effects are expected to occur (>99% likelihood) through the reduction in size and weight of offspring. Based on available DU data for the firing range at APG, DU uptake will not likely affect survival of aquatic plants and animals (<0.1% likelihood). Based on field and laboratory studies conducted at APG and YPG on pocket mice, kangaroo rat, white-throated woodrat, deer, and milfoil, body burden concentrations observed fall into the distributions simulated at both sites. [Fan200506Cv60n1p111] (PMID: 15910910 [PubMed - in process]).

 

 

 

 

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